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RECOGNIZING THE INTERESTS OF THE PUBLIC
IN BROADCAST PROGRAMMING
DON R. LE Duc*
THE ERA OF BAD FEELINGS
The 1980s offered a rather pleasant interlude for most
businesses in the United States as interest rates plummeted,
capitalism gained new prestige, and regulation began to disap-
pear. For the broadcast industry, however, the era was one
marred by bitter clashes with a growing number of hostile and
aggressive citizen groups.
Although many of these attacks on the broadcast industry
came from the so-called "religious right," those who battled
with television networks, broadcast stations and cable TV sys-
tems during this decade also included such widely disparate
organizations as Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), the
Gay Media Task Force, the AFL-CIO, Action for Children's
Television (ACT), the American Jewish Committee, the
NAACP, the National Organization for Women (NOW), and
literally hundreds of local citizen groups.' By 1988, the Fed-
eral Communications Commission (FCC) had become so con-
cerned about the possibility of certain private interest groups
using the broadcast license challenge process as a weapon in
their dealings with stations that the Commission adopted new
rules prohibiting station owners from offering any form of pro-
* Communications attorney and Professor, Department of Mass
Communication, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.
1. This list of private organizations actively attempting to influence
broadcast programming practices is merely illustrative, rather than all-
inclusive. MADD has been lobbying Congress for the past decade to ban
wine and beer advertising on radio and television, and gathered more than
500,000 signatures on a petition to urge congressional action. The Gay and
Lesbian League, as well as the AFL-CIO and NOW, all monitor television
network programs on a regular basis to determine whether gay individuals,
workers and women respectively are portrayed in a favorable manner, and
each group has a subcommittee that works with television producers to
ensure that every dramatic program on television conforms to their standards
in this regard. The NAACP persuaded advertisers to boycott a PGA
tournament held at an all-white country club and the American Jewish
Congress exerted pressure on PBS stations not to air a CPB program
"Flashpoint-Israel and the Palestinians" the group felt presented too
favorable an impression of the Palestinian position.
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gramming concessions to these groups without obtaining prior
FCC approval.
2
In reality, however, it was the advertiser boycott that
inflicted the greatest direct damage on the broadcast industry
during this decade. ABC charged that it had lost more than
$14 million in advertising revenues during a single year, 1989,
because of advertisers canceling their commitments for com-
mercial time in programs targeted for boycott by various citi-
zen groups.3 The following year, ABC and its cable sports
service, ESPN, lost more than $2 million in advertising reve-
nues during just one sporting event, when twenty-one advertis-
ers backed out of their agreements to purchase air time during
coverage of a PGA golf tournament hosted by an all-white
country club.4 In March, 1990, another threatened boycott
caused twenty-four advertisers who collectively spent more
than $2 billion a year in broadcast advertising to withdraw their
commercials from three tabloid television news shows, "Cur-
rent Affair," "Inside Edition" and "Hard Copy."5
In that same year, NBC lost more than $1 million in adver-
tising income from the broadcast of a single, controversial,
made-for-TV movie, while Pepsi Cola decided to cancel its $10
million broadcast advertising campaign featuring the equally
controversial Madonna when faced with boycott threats.6
During this decade, the number of private citizen groups
involved in broadcaster or cable TV controversies grew from
less than 200 to more than 500, as a Gallup Poll conducted in
June, 1990, was revealing that 71% of all adult respondents
believed that the quality of the nation's electronic media serv-
2. Broadcast Renewal Process, 66 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 708 (1989).
3. See Iger Chastises Sponsors for Leaping Before Looking, BROADCASTING, July
30, 1990, at 53. Bob Iger, President of ABC Entertainment, indicated that $9
million of this lost revenue came from the airing of two controversial made-
for-TV movies, and $1 million resulted from refusing to cancel an episode of
"thirtysomething" with a scene featuring two homosexual men in bed
together. Stations affiliated with ABC also lost a cumulative total in excess of
$1 million in revenues when Federal Express canceled all advertising on
these stations after ABC's "20/20" carried an investigative report Federal
Express felt unfairly charged the company with not meeting the terms of its
contract with the U.S. Department of Defense. Id.; see also Fed Ex ABC Ad Ban
Extends to Affiliates, BROADCASTING, Oct. 9, 1989, at 69.
4. See Advertisers Withdraw Sponsorship of PGA Event, BROADCASTING, July
30, 1990, at 31.
5. See John Dempsey, 24 Advertisers Boycott 'Affair,' 'Edition' 'Copy,'
VARIETY, Mar. 21, 1990, at 1.
6. See Verne Gay, Roe v. Wade Sells Out, But Did the Advertisers Sell Out To
Boycott Threat?, VARIETY, June 17, 1989, at 1; It Didn't Have a Prayer: Pepsi Cans
$10-mil Madonna Ads, VARIETY, Apr. 12, 1989, at 101.
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ices had deteriorated significantly during this same ten year
period.7 Why then, in this otherwise relatively serene era, did
there appear to be such a high level of dissatisfaction with
broadcasters, and such willingness on the part of citizens to
become activists in this one area of business?
Perhaps, as this paper will suggest, this unique hostility
simply reflected a growing awareness on the part of the public
that as federal regulation of broadcast programming dimin-
ished, broadcasters became far less willing to respond to the
concerns of those audiences they served.
THE POWERLESS PUBLIC
In 1981, the FCC began rescinding its rules regulating
radio broadcasting in the United States, and in 1984 it started
to deregulate television broadcasting as well.' During this
same period, the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB)
was forced to abandon its role in maintaining broadcast pro-
gramming and advertising standards of good practice when
charged with anti-competitive conduct by the U.S. Department
of Justice.9 Congress completed this deregulatory cycle in
1984, when it enacted the Cable Policy Act, effectively denying
those communities in which cable systems were located any
authority to influence the programming choices of their cable
system. 10
Although in the process of being "deregulated" by the
FCC, broadcasters were still required to seek renewal of their
licenses at regular intervals and to comply with a limited
7. The Gallup Poll findings were reported in Americans Fell Deluged With
Unwanted Obscenity, MILWAUKEE J., Sept. 23, 1990, at IA. After United Church
of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966), recognized the legal right of
a citizen group to challenge the renewal of a broadcast license, a similar
explosion of public actions against broadcasters took place, but these tended
to be much more tightly focused, politically oriented attacks on specific
broadcaster public information policies or hiring practices, and involved only
a very narrow segment of the population.
8. See In re Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968 (1981); In re The
Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076
(1984).
9. United States v. NAB, 536 F. Supp. 149 (D.D.C. 1982). The
particular practice challenged by the Justice Department was a standard
limiting the number of different commercials that could be aired during each
commercial break. The industry sought to avoid "clutter," the broadcast of
numerous short commercials during a single break, but the Justice
Department claimed this practice denied small advertisers access to network
television audiences.
10. 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (1991).
1992]
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number of programming requirements." In 1987, the Com-
mission rescinded one of these few remaining obligations, the
"Fairness Doctrine," that had obligated broadcasters to offer
balanced coverage of controversial issues of public impor-
tance.' 2 Then, in 1991, a federal court struck down the FCC's
attempt to ban "indecent" broadcast programs, leaving the
"equal access" obligations for legally qualified political candi-
dates and political advertising rules as the only major program-
related regulations remaining in force.' 3
Yet, in reality, the FCC's role in regulating broadcast pro-
gramming had never been as significant as the public seemed
to imagine. Because broadcast networks did not need spec-
trum space' 4 to distribute their programs to affiliate stations,
11. As a congressional agency, the FCC cannot rescind or refuse to
enforce any of those legal obligations imposed on broadcasting by Congress
in the Communications Act of 1934. For that reason the Commission has not
been able to realize its deregulatory policy objectives as rapidly as it would
like. However, in its Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981, Congress did
reduce the broadcast regulatory burden to some extent when it extended the
broadcast television license period from three to five years, and the radio
broadcast license from three to seven years.
12. In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council Against Television
Station WVTH, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043 (1987). A federal court had instructed the
FCC that it need not continue to enforce the Fairness Doctrine, because it
was not included in the congressional legislation that the Commission was
required by law to enforce. Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir.
1987). Personal attack rules and certain requirements imposed on political
editorializing are the only regulatory vestiges remaining of the Doctrine
today.
13. Both of these sets of regulatory requirements are of particular value
to members of Congress. The "equal access" provision, 47 U.S.C. § 315
(1991), guarantees that after receiving the usual news coverage as a federal
legislator during the period between political campaigns, the incumbent can
then prevent any challenger from having a greater access to broadcast
audiences than the incumbent has during the campaign. Caps on political
advertising charges by broadcast stations allow politicians to demand the
lowest rate offered by the station, even though the politician does not actually
qualify for this rate. Because of these political advantages, Congress is
unlikely to rescind these remaining regulatory requirements as long as they
remain legally enforceable.
14. In National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943),
the Supreme Court affirmed the right of the federal government to regulate
the programming content of broadcast stations because, unlike any other
form of mass communication, broadcasters depended upon use of the scarce
and valuable public resource of electronic spectrum space in order to
transmit their messages. Since there was not sufficient spectrum space to
satisfy the demand for broadcast channels, the court held that the privilege to
6se this public resource could be revoked by the federal government if a
broadcaster was not operating in the "public interest." Because this narrow
legal justification authorized federal broadcast program regulation solely on
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the FCC could not use its broadcast licensing process to influ-
ence network programming decisions. Lacking the legal
authority provided by this process, the Commission could only
attempt to shape network program practices through tactics of
persuasion and indirect pressure.
Until the 1980s began, the television networks were the
dominant force in American broadcasting, exercising absolute
control over those programs that nearly 90% of the American
television audience viewed each evening. 15 However, that
power this corporate triumvirate exerted over national televi-
sion service made these networks very tempting targets for var-
ious political crusaders and public activists.
Through the regulation of broadcasting, the FCC was able
to offer the networks shelter from both congressional interfer-
ence and public attack as long as the programs they distributed
conformed to basic content standards recommended by the
agency. 16 Whenever some congressional committee or citizen
group complained about too much violence on television, too
heavy an emphasis on sexual situations, or too much commer-
cialization in programs designed for children, the Commission
could delay action and diminish tensions by pledging to con-
vene hearings to consider these complaints at great length.
In return, the networks attempted to accommodate the
Commission whenever possible, and could achieve the changes
in program content the agency sought but lacked the legal
authority to require through their control over television pro-
duction and distribution processes in the United States. The
NAB proved to be a valuable partner in this process, transform-
ing FCC policy pronouncements into industry standards so that
conformance became an image-building professional responsi-
bility rather than abject submission to some governmental
edict. In addition, the NAB's influence extended beyond that
of the networks and the major market stations to gain compli-
ance from smaller, non-network stations throughout the
nation.
the basis of spectrum usage, it could not be extended to include either
broadcast networks or cable TV systems because both distributed
programming only through privately owned microwave or coaxial networks.
For a more detailed discussion of the significance of this distinction, see
HAROLD L. NELSON ET AL., LAW OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS (6th ed. 1989).
15. A.C. NIELSEN Co., NIELSEN REPORT ON TELEVISION 5 (1979).
16. For a more detailed description of this regulatory relationship
between the FCC and the broadcast networks, see DON R. LE Duc, BEYOND
BROADCASTING: PATTERNS IN POLICY AND LAw 57-77 (1987).
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However, this close cooperative relationship between the
broadcast industry and its federal regulator was totally depen-
dent on the FCC's continuing to furnish the networks and the
nation's broadcast stations with a safe and stable competitive
environment in which they could prosper. When the Commis-
sion decided instead to begin encouraging the growth of cable
TV in the early 1980s, and to authorize low power television
(LPTV), direct broadcast satellites (DBS) and multipoint, mul-
tichannel distribution systems (MMDS) to compete directly
with existing broadcast stations, the inducement for continued
industry cooperation ended abruptly. 7
By the end of the 1980s, as cable TV networks and pay TV
channels were producing and distributing their own television
programs, the three major networks were no longer in a posi-
tion to dictate national television program standards even if
they still had wished to do so. Competition from the new Fox
Network and the growing popularity of cable TV services
resulted in the three network share of primetime viewers drop-
ping from more than 90% to less than 60% of the national
audience within a single decade. As this occurred, the compel-
ling network drive became the abandonment of any standards
of taste that might diminish the popular appeal of a network
program. '8
In 1981, Proctor & Gamble, a sponsor then spending some
$500 million on broadcast advertising each year, demanded the
right to pre-screen all television programs carrying its commer-
cials. Proctor & Gamble then decided on the basis of this
review to withdraw its advertisements from more than fifty
series programs and made-for-TV films.' 9 Other major adver-
tisers soon followed its example, and industry analysts pointed
17. The FCC began to relax its regulatory constraints on cable TV in
1980 when it rescinded its distant TV signal and syndicated program
exclusivity rules that had restricted cable TV signal importation rights. The
agency's action was upheld against broadcast industry challenge in Malrite
TV v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982).
The Commission authorized LPTV service in its Report and Order on Docket
78-253 (Mar. 4, 1982). MMDS service was authorized in its present form by
ITFS Service, 94 F.C.C. 203 (1983), and DBS regulatory policy was
established in Notice of Proposed Policy Statement and Rulemaking in
General Docket 80-603 (Oct. 22, 1981).
18. The eroding financial strength of the networks during the 1980s is
reflected in the fact that each of them fell prey to take-overs during the
decade. Capital Cites Broadcasting acquired ABC, General Electric
purchased NBC, and CBS was the victim of an inside take-over by Lawrence
Tisch and his associates.
19. See Butler Speech Sets Off Waves of Dispute Over Television Sex and Violence,
BROADCASTING, June 22, 1981, at 19.
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to the cancellation of "Charlie's Angels," "Three's Company"
and "Vegas" as illustrations of how advertiser standards were
changing the nature of television programming.20 Within a
short time, though, this effort of advertisers to fill that void in
program standards enforcement created by FCC deregulatory
policies and the disbanding of the NAB Code Authority
became much less intensive. However, many sponsors contin-
ued to insist on viewing controversial programs before
allowing their advertisements to be scheduled during these
shows.2 1
At this point, it appeared that broadcasters would be free
to use the public resource of spectrum space to transmit virtu-
ally any type of programming they chose, no matter how offen-
sive these shows might be to certain segments of the
population. In 1987, however, the FCC under a new chairman,
decided to reassert the Commission's "indecency" standard. 2
The Commission intended to limit the possibility of children
being exposed to such patently offensive programs by permit-
ting the programs to be broadcast only between the hours of
midnight and 6 a.m. Not content with this modest policy objec-
tive, Congress compelled the agency in 1990 to prohibit inde-
cent programming at any time of day or night.25 Predictably, a
federal court soon overturned this ban as being unnecessarily
broad in its restraint of constitutionally protected free speech.
20. See Whoever Blinked, The Bottom Line Is That TV Changed,
BROADCASTING, July 6, 1981, at 29.
21. One reason Proctor & Gamble may have decided to abandon its
I campaign was the fact that several of the soap operas P&G owned and
produced often included romantic scenes far more suggestive than the
primetime shows the company was criticizing.
22. In 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court, in FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726, reh 'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978), had affirmed the right of the FCC
to impose more stringent controls on broadcasting, because of its use of the
broadcast spectrum, and its greater accessibility to children in the home, than
could legally be imposed on other media. The agency did not decide to
assert this authority, however, until 1987, when it adopted its New Indecency
Enforcement Standards, 62 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1218 (1987). The standards
prohibited the broadcasting of content that "describes in terms patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the
broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs . . . at times of
the day when there is a reasonable risk that children might be in the
audience." Id. at 1219.
23. In July of 1990, the FCC was forced by a congressional mandate to
adopt a rule totally prohibiting indecent broadcast programming, even
though the Supreme Court, in the Pacifica case, had clearly indicated that the
agency could not ban such constitutionally protected speech, but could only
"channel" it to those hours of the broadcast day when children were least
likely to be exposed to it.
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Consequently, one of the last remaining vestiges of federal
authority over broadcast programming is now no longer
enforceable.24
Ironically, then, even though the American system of
broadcast regulation never allowed the federal government or
its citizens to exert any significant influence on the nature of
broadcast programming, the widely held belief that it did
caused many members of the public to feel abandoned by gov-
ernment in the early 1980s. This occurred when what seemed
to be the primary legal channel for challenging broadcast pro-
gram practices was suddenly closed to them. As the FCC
began its withdrawal from issues of program content, groups of
citizens offended by particular radio and television program
practices responded as those denied legal redress have often
done in the past: by resorting to private pressure tactics to
achieve results they believed could no longer be accomplished
through the legal system.
OUR TELEVISED CULTURAL ENVIRONMENT
Although deregulatory policies in other fields have been
criticized by various citizen groups during the past decade,
public reaction to the deregulation of broadcasting appears to
have been uniquely hostile and intense. The most likely expla-
nation for the breadth and bitterness of these public attacks is
television's equally unique role in modern American life.
The typical adult in the United States now spends more
than thirty hours each week watching television, while the aver-
age child devotes almost as much time to watching television as
attending school each year. 25 Because of the popularity of tele-
vision viewing, the three major networks continue to exert a
strong influence upon public tastes and attitudes, despite the
fact that their share of the television audience has diminished
by one-third during the past decade. Even today, any modestly
popular action-adventure or situation-comedy series scheduled
by a network will be viewed by more Americans than those who
24. Court Throws Out FCC's 24-Hour Indecency Ban, BROADCASTING, May
20, 1991, at 33.
25. A.C. NIELSEN Co., NIELSEN REPORT ON TELEVISION 8 (1990). The
average 6-11 year old child watches television 23 hours and 39 minutes per
week, or 1230 hours per year. The average seven-hour, five-day school week,
during the 40 weeks most grade and high schools are in session represent
1400 hours annually. Recent studies also indicate that Americans now spend
more than 40% of all their leisure time watching television. See ROBERT
KUBLEY & MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, TELEVISION AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE
71 (1990).
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will read any bestselling novel or attend any single feature film
that entire year.26 In other words, virtually every network tele-
vision series producer has a greater opportunity to influence
public sentiments, beliefs and values than even the most popu-
lar of novelists or film makers.
Beyond this, those primetime situation comedy and action-
adventure series Americans share as viewers provide a sense of
''community" that has long since vanished from most of our
lives. Lacking the comforting companionship once offered by
family and neighbors, we find ourselves gossiping with
acquaintances about the exploits of television characters we
know more intimately than virtually anyone in our own lives.27
With as many as 50 million other Americans joining in the
viewing of a single television network program, it is not surpris-
ing that this single bond uniting us is broader and more exten-
sive than any other political, religious or social connection we
might also happen to share.
As legends of old, these modern mass cultural sagas shape
public attitudes and belief, and color the characteristics of
every societal value they present in dramatic form.28 Yet,
unlike traditional folklore these stories are not primitive,
immutable statements of our cultural heritage, but powerfully
26. A moderately popular TV series program, such as "Perfect
Strangers" or "Night Court," generally earns a Nielsen rating in the range of
15, meaning that in 15% of the nation's 92 million households, this program
is being viewed. At 2.2 viewers per household, each show plays to an
audience of almost 30 million people, three to four times the readership of a
runaway best seller and a larger group than all but six feature films have been
able to attract during the past decade.
27. In JOSHUA MEYROWITZ, No SENSE or PLACE (1985), the author cites
a number of VCR usage studies indicating that one of the major reasons
given for taping popular dramatic series, that the viewer is unable to see
when broadcast, is to stay abreast of those plot lines and characters the
viewer's friends tend to discuss. This is borne out by the fact that these tapes
are generally erased if too much time has elapsed between the broadcast and
the viewing, because the out-dated information won't serve this purpose
effectively.
28. In 1988, for example, a coalition of major television program
producers agreed to discourage the use of drugs, liquor and cigarettes
through various dramatic devices in their network programs, developing plot
lines to illustrate the evils of drug usage, and relegating drinking and
smoking only to unsympathetic series characters. See Producers Just Say "No, "
VARIETY, June 29, 1988, at 12. While no one would criticize this effort, it
does raise the question of how many other crusades in the guise of television
drama have been launched by these producers to achieve their own social
objectives in the past.
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compelling man-made myths whose themes can be skillfully
shaped to influence and persuade.
2 9
Network news is also the most powerful and pervasive
form of public information in the United States, determining to
a large extent which specific national and international issues
will dominate the thoughts of American citizens.30 Any news
item mentioned on one of the three network evening news
shows will be known by more than ten times as many people as
will read about it in the New York Times or Washington Post, and
decisions about what items to include in those nineteen min-
utes allotted to news during each half hour show will define the
world for that 40% of the population whose primary source of
information is television news.3 ' This power to decide what the
public should know and how each issue should be treated is of
particular concern when several studies conducted during the
past decade have revealed that broadcast journalists tend to
have political convictions far to the left of the public they
serve.
3 2
It has been fashionable during this era of deregulation to
argue that a competitive marketplace offering a broad variety of
viewing options will soon dilute the concentration of control
that has made the network television the dominant news and
entertainment force in American society.3 3 Unfortunately, this
argument seems to be based on at least two erroneous
assumptions.
The first is that the public will eagerly seek out competing
non-network sources of television programming when they
29. See MEYROWITZ, supra note 27, for case studies of how television
programming has influenced, among other things, the women's movement,
the concept of family, and presidential politics in the United States.
30. It is interesting to note, for example, that the Washington Post had
been running stories about the Watergate break-in for 10 weeks before initial
network television news coverage of the event transformed it into a national
scandal. Similarly, several newspapers in the United States, including the
New York Times, had provided extensive coverage of the starvation occurring
in Ethiopia for several months before the first network news stories about the
desperate plight of the Ethiopians suddenly galvanized relief efforts to aid
these people.
31. ROPER ORGANIZATION, PUBLIC ArTITUDES TOWARDS TELEVISION AND
OTHER MEDIA 8 (1989).
32. See, e.g., RTNDA and the State of Electronic Journalism, BROADCASTING,
Dec. 12, 1988, at 68-73 (discussing several of these studies and the ethical
problems they create for broadcast news editors).
33. The opposite trend is already quite pronounced in broadcast
journalism, with networks and local television stations seeking mergers with
international news pooling organizations and cable systems in order to
reduce costs and increase the cost-effectiveness of their operations.
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become available. The fact is that prime time network viewing
has leveled out at 60% of the television audience in recent
years and does not appear likely to diminish further in the fore-
seeable future. Those cable services now competing with the
network seldom attract more than 1% or 2% of the audience,
and then primarily with programs originally scheduled on net-
work television.3 4 The problem seems to be that while viewers
may glance at cable's all-news, all-sports or all-music channels
for a few minutes each evening, and even watch one or two
cable-delivered features on a regular basis, they continue to
want to share with others that feeling of commonality created
by viewing those massively popular programs only network tel-
evision provides.
The other assumption not borne out by the facts is that
increasing the number of video delivery channels will automati-
cally increase the amount of television programming produced
for the public. In reality, the major constraint on television
program production has never been the limited number of
channels capable of delivering these programs, but rather the
limited amount of capital available to produce them. 5 With
each thirteen-week run of a typical, half-hour situation comedy
demanding an investment of $6.5 million, and only 25% of
these series currently recouping their production costs, it is
easy to understand why an explosive expansion in the number
of cable networks and channels during the past decade has not
resulted in an equally impressive expansion in the number of
television programs produced. 36 Instead, these additional
video channels offer, for the most part, simply more opportuni-
ties to see the same old television network series reruns at dif-
ferent times.
34. See Warner Study Promotes Acquired Product, BROADCASTING, July 15,
1991, at 26.
35. For a more extensive discussion of those financial constraints that
limit television program production, see Don R. Le Duc, Deregulation and the
Dream of Diversity, 32 J. COMM. 164-78 (1982).
36. For a listing of current program production costs see 1990-91
Network Primetime at a Glance, VARIETY, Sept. 17, 1990, at 35. Although cable
TV network growth has resulted in a 400% increase in national TV program
delivery capacity since 1979, TV program production during the same period
increased less than 10%. The major effect of this increased demand for
productions was to more than double the adjusted for inflation costs of each
show produced. See David Kissinger, Real-Life Meller for Ailing TV Moviemakers,
VARIETY, July 8, 1991, at 19.
37. This continues to be true, even as the cable industry talks of video
channel compression techniques that could increase cable system capacities
to 500 channels. That segment of additional channels to be devoted to
entertainment would not carry additional program services, but rather
19921
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In view of the substantial amount of influence television
networks continue to exert over American mass culture, why is
it that our system of laws has not provided any means for mak-
ing these networks responsive to the concerns of the public
about the manner in which this culture is being shaped? The
reason for this lack of legal responsibility is embedded in our
common law tradition of legal analysis by analogy, even when
the passage of time may have grossly distorted the logic of its
application.
THE PRIMITIVE NATURE OF AMERICAN MASS
COMMUNICATION LAW
Our Bill of Rights was adopted at a time when the only
"mass communicators" were the soapbox orator and the print-
ing press operator. The declaration of the First Amendment
that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press .. -38 was a sensible protection against
the governmental interference with the right to speak or pub-
lish. Even after some newspapers' owners became publishing
giants in the late 19th century, able for the first time to mobil-
ize public opinion on a nationwide basis, there were still
enough competing papers in each area to limit the influence of
these publishers.
When radio broadcasting began in the 1920s, law encoun-
tered the first communications medium that delivered its
message directly into each family living room, accessible to eve-
ryone including the youngest of children. Within a few years,
radio had also become the first truly pervasive medium, its sto-
ries, characters and commentary so universally known that peo-
ple in every region of the nation were united by the same
cultural experiences.
Our law could have drawn a distinction at this point
between constitutionally protected human speech and publica-
tion on the one hand, and the distribution of mass entertain-
ment on the other, requiring the latter because of its differing
purpose, accessibility to children and greater influence upon
society to comply with a higher standard of care than the tradi-
tional orator or publisher."9 Instead, broadcast regulation was
different pay-per-view feature films on each channel running 24 hours a day
that a subscriber could select at any time for viewing.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
39. A 1915 U.S. Supreme Court decision actually drew this distinction
with respect to motion pictures, ignoring the film company's claim of
constitutional free speech protection to classify it as a business subject to
BROADCAST PROGRAMMING
justified only on the much narrower grounds of its use of the
public resource of broadcast spectrum space.
40
Because this legal exception to what otherwise would have
been unconstitutional government action was so narrowly
drawn, the FCC was unable to extend its authority to regulate
the programming practices of radio or television networks. 4'
Later, as cable TV emerged as a major electronic media com-
petitor, this restriction on the legal authority of the Commis-
sion would have even more profound consequences.
It was difficult for the FCC to regulate cable TV effectively,
because cable systems, as the networks, did not require spec-
trum space to deliver their programs. Lacking the legal author-
ity to impose programming obligations on cable TV, the
Commission decided instead in the late 1970s to create a "level
playing field" for the two rival media by reducing television's
program obligations so that it could compete at parity with
cable TV. In essence, the agency adopted the position that
since it was not granted by law that authority necessary to regu-
late cable TV, it would not continue penalizing the broadcast
industry by forcing it to comply with program standards that
could not be imposed on its competitor.
Congress extended this deregulatory relief still further in
1984 when it released cable systems from virtually all of those
programming promises that cable operators had made to
municipalities in order to receive a cable franchise.42 Unfortu-
nately, in doing so, Congress also effectively denied local citi-
zens a voice in the selection of programs that best served the
needs of the community, a fundamental regulatory objective of
the FCC for the past fifty years. Although the ascendancy of
state control. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230
(1915). In 1952, the Supreme Court for the first time recognized the free
speech rights of film in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1953).
40. National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
41. The FCC could influence these practices indirectly, by using its
licensing power over broadcast stations affiliated with each network, or the
stations that each of the networks owned to indicate displeasure over certain
types of program content, but reactive, negative authority made it difficult for
the Commission to achieve positive improvements in programming, such as
more cultural features or shows designed to meet the emotional or
educational needs of children.
42. Municipalities were able to impose programming and other
conditions on cable operators, because cable systems require "easements,"
or grants of public right-of-way, essential for crossing city property in order
to string system trunk lines. The congressional action allowed cable
operators to breach virtually every term of the easement contract the city had
bargained for in good faith on behalf of its citizens.
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the network doomed these efforts in the field of broadcasting,
community involvement in cable TV seemed to be on the rise
when Congress decided to undercut its legal foundations to
relieve the cable industry of any troublesome public
responsibility.
In each of these recent electronic media legal and policy
proceedings, the one interest that has been virtually ignored is
that of the public in the quality of our society's mass cultural
environment. The FCC has invoked the term "public interest"
on numerous occasions in the past as a ritual phrase to sanctify
decisions generally reached on other grounds, but our judicial
system still tends to envision these conflicts as pitting the hum-
ble orator against a powerful and censorious government. This
result occurs even in situations when the orator is actually a
corporate giant like NBC or Time-Warner, and the government
agency is only some small town cable TV citizen advisory
board.
The lack of sophisticated reasoning in mass communica-
tion law is simply a reflection of its limited history as an area of
jurisprudential thought. It was not until 1919 that the first
Supreme Court decision defining the limits of federal authority
over freedom of expression was issued, and not until 1925 that
free speech was also held to be protected from state or local
constraints.43 The constitutional basis for broadcast regulation
was not established by the Court until 1943, and film was only
recognized as a communications medium meriting first amend-
ment protection in 1952. 44
Because American mass communication law remains in its
earliest stages of development, its basic principles are still
capable of being refined to reflect societal interests it now lacks
the capacity to consider. In contrast, for example, both tort and
contract law, as most other areas of our jurisprudence, extend
back in time through several centuries of legal thought and
analysis. During these intervening centuries, constant judicial
interpretations of the relative priorities that should be
43. In Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), the Court found
that the free speech guarantees of the First Amendment limited the authority
of Congress to pass legislation restricting freedom of expression. In Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), the Court found that the "due process"
clause provision of the Fourteenth Amendment included free speech as one
of those privileges that could not unreasonably be restricted by state or local
law. Ironically, in both of these cases the conviction of the defendant for free
speech activities was upheld.
44. See National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. 190; Burstyn v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495 (1952).
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accorded various legal interests in conflict led the case law of
torts from crude strict liability to the concept of degrees of
causal negligence; as contract evolved from a ritual of rigid for-
malities to questions of mutuality and intent. So, it is still
entirely possible at some future date that the interests of mem-
bers of the public in the quality of electronic media program-
ming will be recognized, at least under certain circumstances,
as deserving as much recognition as the interests of those
industries engaged in commissioning and distributing this
programming.
ENHANCING THE PUBLIC INTEREST
However attractive it might appear, the "marketplace"
solution for making electronic media programming truly
responsive to the needs and interests of the public is doomed
by its very nature to fail. The responsiveness of any market-
based operation, whether advertiser or subscriber supported, is
determined by the relative affluence of each group it serves. As
a result, such a media marketplace will eagerly fulfill every pro-
gramming wish or desire of the affluent urban elite, while
ignoring the interests of those who have the misfortune to be
young, elderly, poor or live in rural areas. While "effective
demand" may be an equitable way of determining who may
enjoy the privilege of driving a luxury automobile or owning a
yacht, it seems less equitable when used to decide whose inter-
ests will be served by that mass cultural environment in which
we all share.
Another problem with the "marketplace" concept is its
tendency to suggest that the Hollywood video and film produc-
tion industry is a robustly competitive one, capable of provid-
ing audiences with a wide array of programs reflecting vastly
different social and political viewpoints. In point of fact, the
financial risks involved in program production have operated
to restrict opportunities in this field to only a small band of
veteran producers, directors and writers who tend to share the
same positions on most major societal issues.4 5 Thus, rather
than offering the public a rich medley of divergent, dramatic
treatments of questions ranging from AIDS to Zionism, audi-
45. See, e.g., MEDIA RESEARCH CENTER, AND THAT'S THE WAY IT ISN'T
(1990). A study of the 1991-92 primetime network schedule by NBC reveals
that more than 75% of all programming has been supplied by only five major
producers. See Dennis Wharton, NBC Decries Hollywood Grip, VARIETY, July 8,
1991, at 22.
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ence choice is generally limited simply to selecting which minor
variation of the same familiar theme to view.
But perhaps the greatest fallacy promoted by the market-
place argument is that because the consumer is king, all that
each individual need do to change the nature of television pro-
gramming is to refuse to watch those programs that offend.46
This is about as useful as saying that we can solve the problems
of a polluted atmosphere simply by closing our windows.
Unlike the novel or newspaper, electronic mass media are
not contained within individual usage. Rather, they permeate
our mass cultural environment and affect the quality of our
lives whether or not we choose to view or listen. Like the non-
smoker in the smoke-filled room, an atmosphere created by
others intrudes upon us without concern for our own personal
feelings.
To rely solely on personal viewing choices to alter the
nature of our programming is about as hopeless as depending
only on boycotts of polluting industries to solve all our ecologi-
cal problems. Recognizing the futility of attempting to save
our natural resources through the marketplace tactics alone,
the federal government ultimately has begun to adopt stan-
dards to protect the interests of each citizen in a clean and
healthful environment.4 7
Unless American law at some point recognizes a similar
societal interest in maintaining the quality of the nation's elec-
tronic media environment, or allows individuals or groups to
protect their own mass cultural identities, the current guerrilla
46. Other flaws in this argument include the fact that individual viewing
choices are not measured by any rating service. Unless a viewer is among that
minuscule sampling group whose viewing preferences are reported in a
ratings service for broadcasters and advertisers, deciding to watch or not
watch a show makes a statement no one hears. In addition, in an advertising
world ruled by demographics, even among the viewing choices recorded by a
rating service, some votes-those of the young, affluent urban dwellers, for
example-have far more impact on programming decisions than those of the
poor or elderly.
47. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1967, 42 U.S.C. § 4321
(1989), and the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency in 1970,
marked the first major federal recognition of the need to preserve the
physical environment. Prior to that time, courts tended to be unsympathetic
with environmental concerns that limited industrial development. Typical is
the comment of the court in Gardner v. International Shoe Co., 49 N.E.2d
328 (Ill. App. Ct. 1943), that "restraining normal business activity is contrary
to public policy." Id. at 335. Even as late as 1970, in Boomer v. Atlantic
Cement, 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970), a court refused to enjoin industrial
pollution because damage caused by the pollution was found to be less than
the costs of reducing the pollution.
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warfare between the media and organized private interests
seems destined to continue unabated, with the ordinary citizen
denied any voice in that process of shaping our mass cultural
environment which, in turn, shapes every aspect of our lives.
Since these clashes are no longer between government and
the soapbox orator, but rather between citizens and those
industries that finance and distribute our electronic media pro-
grams, the most effective means available for resolving these
conflicts would be through Congressional legislation acknowl-
edging the unique role these media perform in our society, and
establishing procedures to ensure that extensive power they
have over our mass culture is not abused.48 This might best be
accomplished by classifying electronic mass media corporations
as "trustees" charged with serving the interests of the public,
with their special fiduciary obligation being based both upon
the pervasiveness of their mass cultural influence and their
ready accessibility to children in the home.49
This obligation to offer a balanced array of programming
satisfying all major public needs could then be enforced either
through private class actions filed in federal court or through
federal mediation hearings. In either case, these arguments
and negotiations would be taking place for the first time pub-
licly, in open proceedings, rather than secretly behind those
closed doors that deny the typical citizen any role in this vital
process.
In the long run, however; if experts should be correct in
predicting the coming of community based fiber optic deliv-
ered video and information systems that will replace over-the-
air transmission of electronic mass media services by the year
2115, this mechanism for permitting citizen involvement in the
electronic media programming process can then be made both
far more efficient and far less complex.5 ° Providing citizen
48. This, of course, would require an extensive lobbying effort because
the NAB, NCTA (National Cable Television Assn.), the television networks,
broadcast stations, MSOs (large cable owners) and cable system operators
invest more than $20 million in political public relations and campaign
financing activities each year. See, e.g., NAB Board Adopts $16.6 Million Budget,
BROADCASTING, Jan. 22, 1990, at 42.
49. The Radio Conference of 1922 considered recommending to
Congress legislation that would have made radio broadcasters trustees for
the benefit of the public, but this concept was eventually rejected, in part
because it seemed so unlikely at the time radio would ever become a major
medium in the United States. See Edward F. Sarno, Jr., The National Radio
Conferences, 13J. BROADCASTING 189 (1969).
50. See, e.g., Telcos Are Knocking at the Door, BROADCASTING, Apr. 9, 1990,
at 53.
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access at the local rather than national level will allow those
media channels delivered by each system to more closely reflect
the values and interests of that community it serves.5 '
Unless individuals in our society are recognized by law as
having the same rights to improve their cultural environment
as they do to improve their physical environment, they can be
expected to continue to resort to any tactic at their disposal to
achieve that objective. To describe these groups or their
actions as being "censorious," "narrow-minded" or "un-Amer-
ican" simply reveals the arrogance of an industry now virtually
free of any legal responsibility towards the public.52
In truth, of course, if private pressure on television produ-
cers to influence program content actually does constitute
"censorious" behavior, then no one engages in censorship
more aggressively than the networks themselves with their
insistence on forcing violence, car chases or cleavage into any
program they agree to distribute. In the last analysis, then, the
question is not whether those who create television programs
should be free to communicate with the public as they wish, but
rather whether that small group of media conglomerates that
now finances and delivers these programs should continue to
have absolute power to shape television programs as they wish.
American law has finally recognized the right of citizens to
protect the quality of their physical environment. Why should
law deny citizens a similar right to protect the quality of their
mass cultural environment from a contamination that in its own
way may well diminish the quality of their lives as much as
those noxious fumes or putrid wastes they now have the power
to prevent?
51. As ChiefJustice Burger observed when allowing communities some
degree of flexibility in determining what descriptions or depictions they
would classify as being obscene:
It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First
Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi
accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas or
New York City. People in different States vary in their tastes and
attitudes, and this diversity is not to be strangled by the absolutism
of imposed uniformity.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 32-33 (1973).
52. See Crusade Sets Out to Clean Up TV, BROADCASTING, Feb. 9, 1981, at
